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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-1609 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RONALD GALATI,  
 
              Appellant 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey  
(D. C. Criminal No. 1-14-cr-00173-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez                        
                        
Argued on April 28, 2016 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROTH, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 19, 2016) 
                                              
Honorable Judge McKee was Chief Judge at the time this             
appeal was argued. Judge McKee completed this term as 
Chief Judge on September 30, 2016. 
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Brett G. Sweitzer, Esquire  (Argued) 
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
601 Walnut Street 
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Philadelphia, PA 19106 
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Mark E. Coyne, Esquire   (Argued) 
Office of United States Attorney  
970 Broad Street 
Room 700 
Newark, NJ 07102 
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O P I N I ON  
   
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 After an eight day trial, a jury found that Ronald Galati 
had participated in a murder-for-hire scheme that culminated 
with the intended victim, Andrew Tuono, being shot in his 
hand, pelvis, and lower back.  Galati was charged and 
convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(o) for aiding 
and abetting the use of a firearm during and related to a crime 
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of violence and conspiring to do the same.  Galati appeals 
these convictions and asks us to find that using interstate 
commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, is not a “crime of violence.”  
Following our decision in United States v. Robinson,1 we will 
look at all of Galati’s contemporaneous convictions in 
determining whether or not he has aided and abetted the 
discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence.  Based on 
the facts found by the jury, Galati committed a crime of 
violence.  Accordingly, we will affirm his convictions. 
 
I. 
 On November 30, 2013, two masked gunmen fired 
shots outside the Atlantic City home of Andrew Tuono.  Both 
Tuono and Tiffany Galati, Tuono’s girlfriend and Ronald 
Galati’s daughter, were present at the time of the shooting.  
While Tiffany was unharmed, Tuono was struck in his hand, 
pelvis, and lower back.  As the gunmen fled, they were 
quickly apprehended by police.  After their apprehension, the 
gunmen claimed they had been hired Ronald Galati to kill 
Tuono.  On April 2, 2014, a grand jury in the District of New 
Jersey returned an indictment charging Galati and Jerome 
Johnson with one count of soliciting murder for hire resulting 
in personal injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958; one count 
of causing a firearm to be discharged in the commission of a 
crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c); and two counts of 
conspiring to commit the aforementioned offenses, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(o) and 1958. 
 
                                              
1 --- F.3d. --- (3d Cir. 2016). 
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 At trial, Johnson and the two gunmen, who had pled 
guilty, testified against Galati.  According to the gunmen, 
Galati provided information as to where Tuono could be 
found and promised to pay if he were killed.  Johnson 
testified that Galati telephoned Johnson on the day of the 
planned murder to tell him that Tuono was in Atlantic City.  
Johnson promptly drove the gunmen from Philadelphia to 
Atlantic City.  
 
 The jury returned a verdict finding Galati guilty on all 
counts.  Galati appealed.   
 
II. 
 The only issue Galati has raised on appeal is whether 
he was wrongly convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) of aiding 
and abetting the discharge of a firearm during a crime of 
violence and under 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) of conspiring to do the 
same.2  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  
 
III. 
 Galati’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) required 
a showing that he aided and abetted the knowing and willful 
                                              
2 In his reply brief, Galati claims that the District Court 
erroneously sentenced him to an uncharged, aggravated count 
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1958.  Because this was not raised in 
Galati’s first brief, we consider the issue waived, and we note 
that even if the issue had been properly raised, the alleged 
error did not affect Galati’s aggregate sentence. 
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discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of 
violence.”  He now advances the argument that his 
participation in a murder-for-hire scheme in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1958 is not a crime of violence and therefore his 
conviction under § 924(c) cannot stand.  Because Galati did 
not raise any objections below, we will review for plain 
error.3 
 
 Section 924(c) offers two alternative definitions for 
“crime of violence.”  The first definition encompasses crimes 
that have “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another” as 
one of their elements (the “elements clause”).4  The second 
definition covers crimes that involve “a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property of another may 
be used in the course of committing the offense” (the 
“residual clause”).5  Galati argues that violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1958 is not a crime of violence under the elements clause 
and that the residual clause is void for vagueness in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States.6 
 
 We recently explored the boundaries of what 
constitutes a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) in United 
States v. Robinson.7  Robinson involved a defendant 
convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
                                              
3 United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). 
5 Id. § 924(c)(3)(B). 
6 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating a clause defining 
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). 
7 --- F.3d --- (3d Cir. 2016). 
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1951, who had concurrently been charged with brandishing a 
firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c).  Robinson 
argued, as Galati has here, both that his charged offense was 
not a crime of violence under the elements clause and that the 
residual clause was void for vagueness.  In affirming the 
District Court’s conviction, we held that whether a particular 
crime is a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of § 
924(c) depends on the findings of the jury both as to the 
predicate offense and the contemporaneous § 924(c) offense.  
Because a jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt both that 
Robinson had committed Hobbs Act robbery—an element of 
which is the use of “actual or threatened force, or violence, or 
fear of injury . . . to person or property”8—and that Robinson 
had brandished a firearm in the course of committing Hobbs 
Act robbery, we held that Robinson had properly been found 
to have committed a crime of violence.  Accordingly, we 
declined to reach the defendant’s challenge to the validity of 
the residual clause. 
 
 Galati’s case bears striking resemblance to Robinson’s.  
Both defendants argued that the minimum conduct prohibited 
by their offenses did not have “the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another” as an element.  However, in both cases, a jury 
determined that a firearm had been used in the commission of 
the offense, and in both cases the use of a firearm indicates 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force in 
the commission of the offense.  Thus, on the facts found by 
the jury, we agree with the District Court that Galati 
committed a “crime of violence.” 
 
                                              
8 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). 
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 As we stated in Robinson, determining whether a 
particular crime is a crime of violence under § 924(c) requires 
us to look at all the offenses before the jury to the extent that 
these offenses shed light on whether physical force was used, 
attempted, or threatened in committing the predicate offense.  
The jury found that Galati had either caused another to 
knowingly or intentionally travel in interstate commerce or 
use any facility of interstate commerce with the intention of 
committing murder-for-hire, or had done so himself.  Further, 
the jury found that this activity resulted in personal injury to 
Andrew Tuono.   
 
 While Galati claims that the element of personal injury 
was not charged in his indictment, this is irrelevant for the 
purposes of determining whether or not he has committed a 
crime of violence.  As we have previously observed, 
prosecution under § 924(c) requires that the government 
prove the defendant committed a qualifying offense but does 
not require that the defendant be charged or convicted of such 
an offense.9  Whether the matter was properly charged or not, 
the jury in this case found that Galati’s participation in the 
murder-for-hire scheme resulted in personal injury.  Finally, 
the jury concluded that Galati aided and abetted the discharge 
of a firearm in connection with the aforementioned activity.  
Thus, the question before us is not whether violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1958 is a crime of violence, but whether violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1958 that results in personal injury and during 
which a firearm is discharged is a crime of violence.  The 
discharge of a firearm, coupled with resulting personal injury, 
qualifies as a use of physical force.  Therefore, we hold that 
Galati committed a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
                                              
9 United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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§ 924(c)(3)(A), and we decline to reach his challenge to the 
residual clause.10 
 
IV. 
 Galati’s effort to cast his involvement in a scheme that 
ended with a man being shot as lacking the use of physical 
force is creative, but his arguments defy our recent precedent.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the convictions. 
                                              
10 Appellant argues that our recent decision in Baptiste v. 
Attorney Gen., No. 14-4476, 2016 WL 6595943, at *7 (3d 
Cir. Nov. 8, 2016) forecloses our application of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)’s residual clause.  Although we do not rely on the 
residual clause to resolve this case, we note that Baptise is not 
necessarily applicable here.  In Baptiste, the Court considered 
whether the defendant’s prior state conviction constituted a 
predicate violent offense.  Our inquiry here, however, asks 
whether a federal offense that was contemporaneously tried 
with § 924(c) possession may properly serve as a predicate 
offense.  Resolution here is distinguishable because it does 
not require consideration of a prior state conviction.     
 
